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Abstract. The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the 
climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper 
the complex construct of coopetiton is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game 
Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a 
Pareto solution in a win-win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each 
country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type 
and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest 
a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon 
technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at 
balancing the environmental imbalances. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we provide a coopetitive model for the Green Economy, which is an economy based on 
sustainable development that results in improved human wellbeing and social equity, while it 
significantly reduces environmental risks and ecological scarcities. The Green economy is becoming an 
increasingly present reality in developed countries and beyond. The idea that the economic system 
and the environment involved will take care of themselves, through competition and the narrow self- 
interest, has become less and less credible nowadays. 
 
Unfortunately, at the global level the balance between renewable resources and consumption is going 
into red. This means that we will need to begin to use sources that we do not recharge, creating 
strong environmental imbalances. With a population that has reached the wall of 7 billion and a global 
per capita consumption, which continues to grow, by mid-century our debt of resources will exceed 
the 100 per cent of the environmental GDP. If these two factors outweigh in negative (increase in 
population and increasing per capita consumption), there is the improvement of technology (to do 
more with less) that plays a positive role. But so far this latter factor has not been able to balance the 
combined pressure of population growth and consumption. Thus an important issue concerns the 
climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In this contribution 
we discuss feasible solutions that imply the development of low carbon technologies involving a 
change in the environmental policy of the countries. 
 
In the present paper we apply the notion of coopetition, devised by Branderburger and Nalebuff 
(1995, 1996) in the field of strategic management, to the Green Economy. The notion of coopetition is a 
complex construct, since, according to this concept, the economic agents (i.e. firms or countries) must 
interact to find a win-win solution, that indicates a situation in which each agent thinks about both 
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cooperative and competitive ways to change the game. A coopetitive win-win solution is therefore a 
situation in which each agent must cooperate and compete at the same time. Thus, we provide a 
coopetitive model based on Game Theory which enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a 
coopetitive context, allowing us to find a Pareto solution in a win-win scenario. Moreover, the model 
permits to examine the range of possible economic outcomes along a coopetitive dynamic path. 
In the present work we apply a coopetitive model at a country level (Carfì, Magaudda, Schilirò, 2010; 
Carfì, Schilirò, 2011) instead of microeconomic level of firm (Branderburger, Nalebuff, 1995,1996). 
Each country has to decide whether it wants to collaborate with the rest of the world in getting an 
efficient Green Economy, even if the country is competing in the global scenario. 
Our model will suggest an outcome that aims at balancing the environmental imbalances. The win-win 
solution provided by the model is going to show the convenience for each country to participate 
actively to a program of low-carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of 
climate change. 
 
The model is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output, which is 
determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type. Moreover, it is assumed that there are two 
types of technologies: one is a high-carbon technology, the other is an innovative low carbon 
technology. The model also assumes that there is a sunk cost in the investment required to adopt the 
innovative low carbon technology, this sunk cost constitutes a threshold that any country has to 
overcome in order to use such a technology. Each country competes in the market with all the other 
countries, but it may also choose to collaborate with the rest of the world by adopting a low carbon 
technology, thus contributing to a change in the environmental policy.  
 
 
The three main variables of our coopetitive model are: 
x that represents the strategy of any country c; 
y that represents the strategy of the rest of the world w; 
z that represents the coopetitive technology strategy determined together by the country c and the rest of 
the world w. z is then the instrumental variable for the climate change policy. 
 
 
2. Coopetitive Games 
 
 
We define the coopetitive game in the following way. 
 
Let E, F and C be three non-empty sets. We define two players coopetitive gain game carried by the 
strategic triple (E, F, C) any pair of the form G = (f, >), where f is a function from the Cartesian 
product E×F×C into the real Euclidean plane R2 and > is the usual order of the Cartesian plane, 
defined, for every couple of points p, q, by p > q if and only if the i-th component of the vector p (i.e. 
the real p(i)) is greater than or equal to the component q(i), of the vector q, for each index i, and the 
two vectors are different. 
 
Remark. The difference among a two-players normal-form gain game and a two-person coopetitive 
gain game is simply the presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. 
 
 
2.1 Terminology and notation 
 
Let G = (f, >) be a two players coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E, F, C). We will 
use the following terminologies: 
- the function f is called the payoff function of the game G; 
- the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called the payoff function of the first player and 
analogously the second component f2 is called the payoff function of the second player; 
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- the set E is said the strategy set of the first player, the set F the strategy set of the second player; 
- the set C the cooperative strategy set of the two players. 
- the Cartesian product E×F×C is called the coopetitive strategy space of the game G. 
 
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive game G is the function of 
the strategy space of the game G into the real line defined by 
 
f1(x,y,z) = pr1(f(x,y,z)), 
 
analogously, we proceed for the second component f2. 
 
We give the following interpretation. We have two players, each of them has a strategy set in which to 
choose his own strategy; moreover, the two players can/should cooperatively choose a strategy z in a 
third set C. The two players will choose their cooperative strategy z to maximize (in some sense we 
shall specify) the gain function f. 
 
2.2 Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game 
 
The payoff function of a two person coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-form game) a 
vector valued function with values belonging to the Cartesian plane R2; so that we should consider 
the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space im(f) as an appropriate zone for the bargaining 
solutions. 
 
 
3. The model: A sustainable coopetitive model of economy 
 
 
The coopetitive model we propose hereunder must be interpreted as a normative model, in the sense 
that it will show the more appropriate solutions and win-win strategies chosen within a cooperative 
perspective. 
 
3.1 Strategies 
 
The main strategic variables of the model are: 
 
1) strategies x of a certain country c - the aggregate production of the country c - which directly 
influence both pay-off functions; 
 
2) strategies y of the rest of the word - the aggregate production of the rest of the world w - 
which influence both pay-off functions;  
 
3) a bi-dimensional shared strategy z which is determined together by the two subjects, c and the 
rest of the world w. 
 
Interpretation of the cooperative strategy. 
 
The vector z is the bi-level of investment for new low-carbon technologies, specifically z is a pair 
(z(1),z(2)) where z(1) is the investment of the country c and z(2) the total investment of the rest of the 
world w in low-carbon innovative technologies.  
 
In the model we assume that c and w define ex-ante and together the set C of coopetitive strategies 
and (after a deep study of the coopetitive interaction) the pair z to implement as a possible 
component solution. 
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3.2 Main Strategic assumptions 
 
We assume that any real number x, in the canonical unit interval 
 
E := U = [0,1] 
 
is a possible level of aggregate production of the country c and any real number y, in the same unit 
interval 
 
F := U, 
 
is the analogous aggregate production of the rest of the world w. 
 
Measure units of strategy sets E and F. We assume that the measure units of the two intervals E 
and F be different: the unit 1 in E represents the maximum possible aggregate production of country 
c and the unit 1 in F is the maximum possible aggregate production of the rest of the word w, 
obviously these two units are totally different, but - from a mathematical point of view - we need only 
a rescale on E and a rescale on F to translate our results in real unit of productions. 
 
Cooperative strategy. Moreover, a real pair z, belonging to the canonical square 
 
C: = U1 × U2 := U
2, 
 
is the bi-investment of the country c and of the rest of the world w for new low-carbon innovative 
technologies, in the direction of sustainability of natural resources and for the environmental 
protection. 
 
Also in this case the unit 1 of U1 is the maximum possible investment for the country c and the unit 1 
in U2 is the possible maximum investment for the rest of the world w in direction of low-carbon 
technologies. 
 
Let us assume, so, that the country c and the rest of the world w decide together to contribute by the 
bi-investment z = (z1,z2). 
 
We also consider, as payoff functions of the interaction between c and w, two Cournot type payoff 
functions, as it is shown in what follows. 
 
 
3.3 Payoff function of country c 
 
We assume that the payoff function of the country c is the function f1 of the unit 4-cube U
4 into the 
real line, defined by  
 
 f1(x, y, z) = 4x (1 - x - y) + mz1 + nz2, 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the 4-cube U4, where m is a characteristic positive real number representing 
the benefits of the low-carbon technologies implemented by country c upon the economic 
performances of the country c itself; on the other hand n is a characteristic positive real number 
representing the benefits of the low-carbon technologies implemented by the rest of the world w 
upon the economic performances of the country c. 
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3.4 Payoff function of the rest of the world w 
 
We assume that the payoff function of the rest of the world w in the examined interaction is the 
function f2 of the 4-cube U
4 into the real line, defined by  
 
 f2(x, y, z) = 4y (1 - x - y) + nz1 +mz2, 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the 4-cube U4 , where n is a characteristic positive real number representing 
the benefits of the low-carbon technologies implemented by country c upon the economic 
performances of the rest of the world w and mz2 represents the economical benefit of the low-carbon 
technologies implemented by w upon the economic performances of w itself. 
 
Remark. Note the symmetry in the influence of the pair (m,n) upon the pair of payoff functions 
(f1,f2). 
 
 
3.5 Payoff function of the coopetitive game 
 
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game G = (f, >) with payoff function f given by  
 
f(x, y, z) = (4x (1 - x - y) + mz, 4y (1 - x - y) + nz) =  
 = 4(x (1 - x - y), y (1 - x - y)) + z(1)(m, n) + z(2)(n, m), 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the compact 4-cube U4. 
 
 
4. Study of the game G = (p, >) 
 
 
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in the square U2, the game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff 
function p(z), defined on the square U2 by 
 
 p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z), 
 
is the translation of the game G(0,0) by the vector 
 
v(z) = z1(m, n) + z2(n, m), 
 
so that we can study the game G(0,0) and then we can translate the various information of the game 
G(0,0) by the vector v(z). 
 
So let us consider the game G(0,0). The last game G(0,0) has been studied completely by Carfì in 
Topics in Game Theory (2011). The conservative part in payoff space (the part of the payoff space 
greater than the conservative bi-value (0,0)) is the canonical 2-simplex T, convex envelope of the 
origin and of the canonical basis e of the Euclidean plane R2. 
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Figure 1. Cournòt payoff space. 
 
 
4.1 Payoff space and Pareto Boundary of the payoff space of G(z) 
 
The Pareto boundary of the payoff space of the z-section game G(z) is the segment [e1, e2], with end 
points the two canonical vectors of the Cartesian vector plane R2, translated by the vector 
 
v(z) = z1(m, n) + z2(n, m), 
 
this is true for all bi-strategy z in U2 (bi-dimensional set). 
 
 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G, the image of the payoff function f, is the union 
of the family of payoff spaces 
 
 (im p(z))z∈C , 
 
that is the convex envelope of the of points 0, e(1), e(2), and of their translations by the vectors 
 
v(1,0) = (m, n) 
 
and 
 
v(1,1) = (m, n) + (n, m). 
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Explicative Figures. 
 
We show in the following figures the construction of the coopetitive payoff space in two steps, in the 
particular case (m,n) = (1,2), just to clarify the procedure. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. First step. T + [0,1](1,2) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Final step. f(S) = T + [0,1](1,2) + [0,1](2,1). 
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The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space f(S) 
 
The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space f(S) of the coopetitive game G is the segment 
[P’,Q’], where the point P’ is the translation 
 
e1 + v(1,1) 
 
and the point Q’ is the point 
 
e2 + v(1,1). 
 
In the above figures is the segment [(3,4),(4,3)]. 
 
 
5 Solutions of the model and conclusions 
 
1) Properly coopetitive solution. In a purely coopetitive fashion, the solution of the game in the 
payoff space is the translation of the Nash payoff 
 
(4/9, 4/9) 
 
by the vector 
 
(m + n, m + n); 
 
that is, in the strategic cube S the solution 
 
(1/3, 1/3, (1,1)). 
 
This solution is obtained by cooperating on the set C and (interacting) competing à la Nash in the 
game G(1,1). 
 
Interpretation. The complex game just played was developed with reference to the strategic variables 
x, y, z, and the functional relation f, which represents a continuous infinite family of games à la 
Cournot, where in each member-game of the family the quantities are the variables which vary in order 
to establish the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and where z allows the game to identify possible 
cooperative solutions in a competitive environment, thus we have obtained a “pure coopetitive 
solution”. 
 
Double cooperative solutions. We can go further, finding a solution of Pareto type obtainable by 
“double cooperation”, in the following sense: we assume that in the game the two players will 
cooperate both on cooperative z and on the strategy pair (x,y). 
 
2) Super-cooperative solution. The Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining 
solution, with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with the medium point K of 
the segment [P’, Q’]. This point K represents a win-win solution with respect to the initial (shadow 
maximum) supremum (1,1) of the pure Cournot game if and only if the sum m + n is greater than 1. 
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Figure 4. Double cooperative solution in the payoff space: K. 
 
 
6. Sunk costs 
 
For what concerns the sunk costs, we consider an initial bi-cost (1/3, 1/3) necessary to begin the low-
carbon approach to the production, so that in a non-coopetitive environment we have a translation by 
the vector (-1/3, -1/3) of the Nash equilibrium payoff 
 
(4/9, 4/9). 
 
Although we have a bi-loss, in a coopetitive environment the gain is strictly greater than the absolute 
value of the bi-loss, thus the new Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 
 
K – (1/3,1/3)  
 
is greater than the old Nash equilibrium payoff. As we show in the below figure by the upper cone of 
(4/9, 4/9). 
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Figure 5. Translation by the sunk costs. 
 
 
7. Conclusions.  
 
Our coopetitive model has tried to demonstrate which are the win-win solutions of a coopetitive 
strategy that aims at a policy of climate change to implement a Green Economy. This policy concerns 
the adoption of innovative low carbon technologies, taking into account its sunk costs, and the 
determination of aggregate output of any country c in a non-cooperative game à la Cournot. 
 
The original analytical elements that characterized our coopetitive model are the following: 
 
- firstly, we defined z as the coopetitive variable, which is the instrumental variable of the climate 
change policy, but also we considered z as a bi-dimensional variable z1 and z2; 
 
- secondly, we adopted a non-cooperative game à la Cournot for establishing an equilibrium level of 
the bi-strategy (x,y), that represents the level of output of country c; 
 
- thirdly, we introduced the sunk costs in the function of low carbon technologies; 
 
- finally, we suggested not only a “pure coopetitive solution”, but also a “super-cooperative 
solution” on the Pareto boundary, adopting the Kalai-Smorodinsky method, thus obtaining a 
“best compromise solution”. 
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